

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMICS

Miriam Beblo

Bargaining over Time Allocation

Economic Modeling
and Econometric Investigation
of Time Use within Families



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I have written this dissertational thesis while being a research and teaching assistant at the Institute of Public Finance and Social Policy at Freie Universität in Berlin. The thesis has been completed in December 1999. Having studied bargaining behavior in greater detail now, I must say that my work has benefitted from cooperation of those who accompanied my research during the past five years. First of all I would like to thank my advisors Irwin L. Collier and Notburga Ott for their constant encouragement and precious comments. In presentations and stimulating discussions I also received valuable input from my colleagues at Freie Universität Berlin as well as professors and fellow students at the graduate college "Applied Microeconomics". Most importantly, I am grateful to my husband Sven Ammerlahn for his inspiring and incredibly patient support.

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Bargaining over Time Allocation

In this book, time use behavior within households is modeled as the outcome of a bargaining process between family members who bargain over household resource allocation and the intrafamily distribution of welfare. In view of trends such as rising female employment along with falling fertility rates and increasing divorce rates, a strategic aspect of female employment is analyzed in a dynamic family bargaining framework. The division of housework between spouses and the observed leisure differential between women and men are investigated within non-cooperative bargaining settings. The models developed are tested empirically using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the German Time Budget Survey.

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